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This paper is one of two articles that consider the impact of new 
technologies on the organization of global value chains (GVCs). The 
current paper considers value chains in two representative 
industries, namely, the automotive industry and electronic 
equipment industry, and the other forthcoming paper will examine 
the apparel industry and material processing industry. The study 
draws on the analytical framework developed by Gereffi et al. 
(2005), who presented a GVC typology and mechanism of value 
chain transformation. 
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Impact of new technologies on the organization of global value chains (1): 
dynamic transformations within global value chain typology 
 
Satoshi Inomata1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper is one of two articles that consider the impact of new technologies on the 
organization of global value chains (GVCs). The current paper considers value chains in 
two representative industries, namely, the automotive industry and electronic 
equipment industry, and the other forthcoming paper will examine the apparel industry 
and material processing industry. The study draws on the analytical framework 
developed by Gereffi et al. (2005), who presented a GVC typology and mechanism of value 
chain transformation. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section illustrates the main features of 
Gereffi et al. (2005)’s analytical framework. Then, some generic references to industries 
are presented in terms of the GVC typology introduced in the preceding section. This is 
followed by two case studies: one on the automotive industry and the other on the 
electronic equipment industry, both of which consider the impact of technological 
progress on these industries’ value chains along with the implications for economic 
development by emerging economies. The final section concludes.  
 
 
2. Typology of GVCs2 
 
The main objective of GVC studies is to explore the interplay between value 
distribution mechanisms and the organization of the cross-border production–
consumption nexus. The GVC concept was first collectively framed in discussions by the 
Global Value Chains Initiative (2000–2005), sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation,3 
and further crystallized by Gereffi et al. (2005), whose analytical focus centered on the 
governance structures for organizing international production networks. Who are the 
players in the game? What are the rules? Is it a competitive or a cooperative play? What 
                                                   
1 Chief Senior Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO. 
2 This section is entirely reconstructed using the text from Inomata (2017). 
3 See Gereffi and Kaplinsky (2001). 
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generates the winning opportunities? In answering these questions, GVC studies pay 
attention to the forms of transactions, codified or otherwise, among stakeholders. This is 
because the way transactions are made reflects the structure of power relations between 
the parties, which ultimately determines the scope and magnitude of value distributions 
within the game. 
Traditionally, the issue of GVC governance has been considered in relation to the 
choice between two extreme forms of value chain arrangements: vertical integration (i.e., 
foreign direct investment) and arm’s-length offshoring. Vertical integration assumes a 
hierarchical structure with absolute and unidirectional control by the parent company 
over its subsidiaries. The activities and performance of subsidiaries are strictly 
monitored and assessed in line with their headquarters’ management strategies. In 
contrast, arm’s-length transaction options tend to generate leveled relationships 
between clients (buyers) and subcontractors (service suppliers), and power is exercised 
more or less mutually, unlike in the vertical integration arrangement. 
Within this dichotomy, Gereffi et al. (2005) set out a GVC typology in a higher-
resolution spectrum in accordance with power relations between the contracting parties. 
Figure 1 illustrates five variants of GVC governance. Rectangles represent a firm’s 
boundary, and their size indicates the strength of that firm’s bargaining power in relation 
to the other party. Arrows indicate the direction and extent of business intervention in 
partners’ activities. These can range from supportive, such as creating “win–win” 
scenarios from a long-term perspective, or predatory, by focusing on quick profit in the 
short run. Toward the right of the diagram, clients (headquarters, in the case of the 
“hierarchy” type) possess greater bargaining power and so are considered to exert a 
strong influence over the distribution of value added. 
 
Market-type global value chain 
Producing a commodity of a generic nature does not require any specific investment 
in production facilities for a particular transaction, giving both customers and suppliers 
countless choices for alternative partners. Customers and suppliers are connected 
mainly through open spot-market transactions in a shoulder-to-shoulder relationship. In 
addition, the procurement of a generic commodity will not necessitate an exchange of 
detailed product specification between contractors because the key information is mostly 
reduced to a preset product price available in a book of catalogs. The transaction cost for 
changing business partners is almost negligible, leaving value chains in a constant state 
of flux because of their high price elasticity. 
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Modular-type global value chain 
In business management or industrial engineering, the word “module” generally 
refers to a composite of subcomponents grouped by types of functions they assume in the 
final product. 4  The possibility of different combinations of differentiated modules 
enables producers to design multiple variants of one product. Similarly, if a complex 
transaction can be accommodated in the supply base by adjusting the combination of 
multipurpose equipment, the supplier will not incur transaction-specific investment (no 
hold-up problem) and is thus able to spread the equipment’s use across a wide range of 
potential clients. Even though the information to be exchanged between contractors may 
be considerable (say, for producing a complex product), the relative codifiability of 
transactions, as presumed in this type of GVC governance, compresses the volume of 
interventions, allowing the supplier to take overall control of its own production process. 
This implies that the transaction cost for changing business partners remains relatively 
low. 
 
Relational-type global value chain 
When a manufacturing process involves specialized equipment (for example, the 
mold for a particular shape of product), transactions become asset-specific, and 
contracting parties can become mutually dependent. Specific purpose equipment has 
limited scope for alternative uses, so its productivity will drop considerably when it is 
applied in other contexts. Accordingly, service suppliers (holders of the specialized 
equipment) are not motivated to look for other potential clients. However, it is also 
difficult, or at least costly, for the client to expect the same level of performance from 
alternate suppliers who lack these specialized facilities. As a result, both parties have 
little incentive to search for alternative business relations. Further, reinvestment in the 
specialized equipment to raise productivity increases the asset-specificity of the 
transaction, thus trapping the parties in even deeper mutually dependent relationships. 
 
Captive-type global value chain 
This type of transaction assumes an overwhelming disparity in power among parties, 
as seen in the business relations between a lead firm of global brands and its 
subcontracting local small companies. Service suppliers are expected to follow the client’s 
instructions impeccably and are subject to strict surveillance regarding product quality 
                                                   
4 For example, a modular car may consist of a power-management module (a composite of compressors 
and charge controls), a drive-assisting module (a composite of sensors, cameras, and light emitting 
diodes), and so on. 
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and delivery times. Unlike suppliers in the market-type GVC, captive service suppliers 
have neither sufficient productive capacity to enjoy the scale of mass production nor the 
specialized production facilities needed to claim its uniqueness, as attributed to the 
suppliers in the relational-type GVC. Access to only mediocre production capability 
greatly narrows their opportunities to look for alternative business relations, imposing 
a captive position vis à vis their clients. 
 
Hierarchy-type global value chain 
As stated earlier, this type of GVC generally refers to the relations within a 
vertically integrated firm, such as those found in multinational corporations. 
 
Gereffi et al. (2005) also considered the dynamics of GVC configuration by factoring 
out three parameters: complexity of transactions, ability to codify transactions, and 
capabilities in the supply base (known as the 3Cs model—Complexity, Codifiability, and 
Capabilities). For example, a shift in value chain type from market to relational is 
associated with an increase in transaction complexity. A shift from relational to modular 
assumes an increased ability to codify transactions. Improving capabilities in the supply 
base, other things equal, drives value chains from the captive type toward the market 
type. 
 
Figure 1 Typology of global value chains 
 
 
Source: Author’s drawings based on Gereffi et al. (2005). 
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3. Reference to industries for respective GVC types 
 
The GVC typology introduced here is to some extent associated with specific 
industries according to that industry’s product attributes, such as technological 
characteristics or market trends.5 
The hierarchy type can be typically represented by the automotive industry. A car is 
a product of an extremely complex system containing over 15,000 different types of parts, 
among which the key components are often design-specific and difficult to substitute. In 
the assembly stage, the parts must be carefully aligned with one another in harmony. 
For example, the “computerization” of modern cars has increased the risk that the air 
conditioning system will adversely interfere with electronic-intensive modules, which 
need to be located nearby within a narrow space between the engine and instrument 
panel. Facing such risks, car production requires holistic and systematic coordination of 
every aspect of the production processes from start to finish, which makes governance of 
this value chains highly prone toward vertical integration.  
An example of the captive-type value chain is the apparel industry. Both the input 
materials (fabrics) and final products (clothes) weigh little and can be stored compactly, 
which makes them quite suitable for packaging and shipping. Accordingly, offshoring 
production arrangements progressed in the industry from a relatively early age, under 
tight and unidirectional control of the production processes by global lead firms. 
The offshored tasks are generally labor-intensive and low-skilled, such as cutting 
and sewing, and hence are moved from country to country in search of the least costly 
labor force: Japan in the 1950s–1960s, East Asian newly industrialized economies in the 
1970s–1980s, and China in the 1990s. With wage levels rising in China in recent years, 
these tasks are now offshored further to less-developed economies such as Myanmar and 
Bangladesh.6 
In the preceding section, molds were cited as an example of asset-specific equipment, 
which is a key attribute of relational-type value chains. It should then seem natural to 
consider that value chains in the material processing industry, such as metal stamping 
or plastic molding, are categorized as this type.  
                                                   
5 Note that this GVC typology is neither exhaustive nor exclusive; some types of value chains do not fit 
into any of these five categories, and furthermore, these categories may overlap for certain aspects of 
value chains. Also, we may observe differing GVC types for the same industry across different countries 
and different periods. The reference to industries presented here is for the sake of illustrating the 
principal ideas. 
6 However, a recent trend is toward an increase in “full-package” outsourcing, in which the designing 
process (including the choice of materials) is left to the work of subcontractors. 
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Furthermore, transaction specificity can be considered from a spatial perspective. 
When the product in concern is not suitable for physical delivery, the product supplier is 
likely to locate production facilities near the client’s venue, which ties the supplier to this 
specific transactional relation with the client. For example, as television display increase 
in size it became increasingly difficult to deliver glass panel substrates between factories. 
Sharp’s production of liquid-crystal panel displays may represent such a case because 
the company’s parts suppliers have clustered in the district of Kameyama. Although the 
district’s proximity to Sharp’s research and development center (in the city of Tenri) and 
the local government’s industrial promotion scheme have undoubtedly served as 
incentives for industrial agglomeration, the aforementioned difficulty and risk of product 
delivery might also have influenced the suppliers’ choice of location.  
The electronic equipment industry is typically considered as having a modular-type 
value chain. From its emergence, the industry has had close links with the development 
of military technology; hence, the standardization of its major product lines was 
advanced under the strong military influence. Product standardization was further 
facilitated by the introduction of computer-aided design systems, which allowed 
information on product designs and specifications to be digitized and stored for repeated 
use in the industry. 
In addition, the Information Technology Agreement, a high-level plurilateral free-
trade agreement, was adopted by many countries including emerging economies, and 
thus became another important driver of standardization and modularization of the 
industry’s value chains.  
 
 
4. Technological innovation and value chain dynamics 
 
Developing countries are increasingly recognizing that participation in GVCs is an 
important kick-start to economic development. At the same time, however, they are also 
worried that the prospect for upgrading value chains is limited because their production 
activities are considered to be “locked-in” to the lower value-added segment of global 
production networks. 
In the discussion that follows, we present two cases where technological progress 
triggered a dynamic transformation of value chains from one type to another, with a 
particular focus on growth opportunities for emerging companies in developing countries.  
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4.1 Automotive industry: Modularization of cars 
Section 3 introduced the automotive industry as a typical example of hierarchy-type 
value chains because its industrial organization is highly prone to vertical integration 
given the complexity of its production arrangements. Car manufacturers find it quite 
difficult to outsource the production of key components because of potential interactions 
with other parts during integration processes. 
However, recent developments in architectural design schemes have spurred 
changes. In 2013, Nissan introduced a design scheme called the “common module family” 
into the production lines of 14 models. The scheme’s objective is to reconfigure the 
production system so as to reduce costs yet also maintain the variety of product lines. 
This is pursued through the modularization of products, which increases the proportion 
of standardized common components that can be shared among different models while 
leveraging scale merits through bulk purchases of common inputs. 
Even before the introduction of Nissan’s scheme, Volkswagen devised the “modular 
transverse matrix platform” to develop a wide range of different products and 
implemented it for the production of standard models such as Golf as well as luxury cars 
such as Audi. Toyota later adopted the “Toyota new global architecture” for Prius in 2015, 
while Hyundai Motors, aided by its fully-automated assembly system, engaged in the 
large-scale outsourcing of its main car components, including the cockpit and chassis 
(Nikkei Business, 2013). 
Further, the implementation of modularization schemes can also be found in 
developing countries. As described earlier, a “module” generally refers to a composite of 
subcomponents grouped by type of function assumed in the final product. Each module 
has a high degree of functional autonomy (namely, the mutual interference between 
modules is small), while the standardized architecture of its interface makes it easy to 
combine multiple modules. Accordingly, the modularization of a complex product 
simplifies its manufacturing processes by compressing knowledge-intensive segments of 
production (such as harmonization of car components).  
This has had a strong side-effect of lowering technological barriers to market entry. 
According to Oshika et al. (2009), Shenyang Aerospace Mitsubishi Motors China, for 
example, ran a joint business with a U.S. auto-parts supplier Delphi of selling core 
system components (such as engines and transmissions) mainly to local auto 
manufacturers in China such that the components were pre-adjusted to the 
specifications of client’s individual products (i.e., cars). Engines and 
transmission systems are generally considered far too important to outsource because 
the requirement for relevant parts harmonization is substantial. However, digital 
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technology makes it now possible to codify the harmonization expertise and encapsulate 
it in a chip as a set of digital information, whereby potential conflicts among parts arising 
from variations in car bodies can be mediated through a mere parameter adjustment of 
electronic control units (ECUs).7  
This suggest that even those without top technology can enter the automotive 
market simply by obtaining the said “knowledge capsule” of ECUs. The advancement of 
modularization has accelerated structural change in the automotive industry, from a 
vertically integrated production system to that of value chains in a more open 
environment, which has provided wide opportunities for emerging companies in 
developing countries to join the arena.8  
In reference to the 3Cs model of Gereffi et al. (2005), the gradual transformation of 
the automotive industry’s value chains from the hierarchical-type to modular-type was 
driven by an increased ability to codify transactions for individual tasks along production 
processes as a consequence of product modularization. The well-known theories of 
Vernon’s “product life-cycle” and Akamatsu’s “flying geese” depict a process in which 
technologies originating in advanced economies become obsolete and are passed on to 
less-developed countries, thereby promoting their economic development. The progress 
of modularization accelerates such technological spillovers, yet in a different form, 
namely, the technological catch-up and restructuring occur at the “task level” such as 
design, fabrication, assembly, and marketing, rather than the industry level as 
traditionally envisaged in classical theories. 
 
4.2 Electronic equipment industry: Impact of “platform leaders” 
The electronic equipment industry covers a wide range of products, from personal 
computers (PCs) to mobile communication devices. Traditionally, the industry’s supply 
chains have been governed by final consumer goods manufacturers such as Apple, 
Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, NEC, and Samsung, who organized and presided over their 
own GVC networks, which could take the form of several types. The most dominant GVC 
configuration is the modular type, yet other types of value chains are also observed 
                                                   
7 Shenyang Aerospace Mitsubishi Motors designed engines and transmissions, and then Delphi took 
charge of ECU adjustment in order to customize these system components according to the individual 
designs of clients’ vehicles (Oshika et al. 2009). 
8  The modularization of car architecture has also invited new entrants from other industries. 
Panasonic’s subsidiary Automotive & Industrial Systems develops system component packages in three 
areas: cockpit systems (displays, gauges, and car navigation devices); drive-assist systems (sensors, 
cameras, and LEDs); and power management systems (compressors and charge controls). Panasonic’s 
technological know-how from manufacturing electrical equipment is fully applied to and embodied in 
the car production schemes. (Nikkei Business, 2013.) 
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depending on the nature of outsourcing activities; for example, the market type for 
generic parts procurement, relational type for the supply of product-specific components, 
and, at the end of the manufacturing processes, the captive type for the final assembling 
stage. Given the variety of GVC types throughout the entire supply-chain spectrum, the 
industry is often associated with a smooth U-shaped graph to represent the relationship 
between production process and value added, i.e., a so-called the “smiley curve.” 
Recently, such an industrial profile was increasingly destabilized by the emergence 
of a new player called “platform leaders.” Here, “platform” is defined as “a set of common 
components, modules, or parts from which a stream of derivative products can be 
efficiently created and launched” by “constraining the linkages among the other 
components” (Baldwin and Woodard, 2009). A large-scale integrated circuit, which often 
determines the performance level of the product in which it is embedded, provides a good 
example. Platform leaders develop platforms and facilitate an industry’s technological 
progress. In this process, a platform imposes structural constraints on the design and 
specification of other auxiliary components because the platform ultimately governs the 
final product’s functions and performance. Given such a relationship, platform leaders 
maneuver other parts suppliers into producing complementary products whose designs 
are highly subordinate to the platform’s interface specification while completely black-
boxing the interior of the platform module itself. As a result, platform leaders acquired 
an overwhelming power to influence the way that supply chains are organized in the 
industry.  
Platforms can be found in various industries, from consumer electronics such as 
LCD TVs to special industrial machinery such as numerically controlled machine tools. 
In the PC industry, the most prominent example is “Win-tel,” which comes from 
Microsoft’s operating system Windows and chip designer/vender Intel.  
In recent years, platform leaders have also emerged in developing countries. 
Particularly notable is the increasing presence of MediaTek and Spreadtrum in China’s 
mobile phone components market. Shiu and Imai (2009) argue that these companies 
have boosted their influence in the industry by devising a unique marketing strategy. 
Alongside the production and sales of chips, they also offered an assembly blueprint for 
mobile phone terminals as a set package. The blueprint provided a thorough how-to 
guideline for producing mobile phones that embody their chips, such as the layout of 
parts configuration and electrical wiring, and even included a list of recommended parts 
suppliers.  
According to Shiu and Imai (2009), sales promotion through blueprint packaging is 
known to have originated in the business model of US/European chip vendors who sought 
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marketing opportunities in China. However, the production guidelines in their 
blueprints covered only basic aspects of terminal assembly. Lacking detailed 
explanations, these blueprints were not sufficiently user-friendly for Chinese 
manufacturers with limited experience in the production of high-tech equipment like 
mobile phones.  
In contrast, Taiwanese MediaTek provided full guidelines for every aspect of 
assembly tasks, even covering multimedia functions for music/video playback, and 
offered a package with a considerably cheaper license fee than those of US/European 
rivals. As a result, Chinese manufacturers gained opportunities to produce low-cost yet 
highly appealing products for local consumers.9 
Effective functioning of platforms assumes the modularization of final products’ 
architecture because a platform is a complete module on its own that does not require 
surrounding components to have any product-specific attributes except those regarding 
connection. Accordingly, any parts suppliers who have adopted the platform’s interface 
can enter the market.  
Correspondingly, this tends to invite a massive entry of producers into the industry, 
leading to an excessive supply of homogeneous products and price competition. In the 
case of China’s mobile phone industry, product homogenization became increasingly 
evident after the introduction of MediaTek’s chipsets into the parts market. Although 
the “turn-key” solution of MediaTek’s chipsets was highly attractive for local 
manufacturers, it also became difficult for them to differentiate their final products 
through own in-house elaboration of the chipset because MediaTek did not disclose its 
software source code.  
Around 2004, China experienced an observable excess supply of mobile phone 
terminals. In order to capture consumers’ attention, local manufacturers rushed to 
introduce multiple models with very similar functionalities. The market was flooded 
with undifferentiated products, and the industry’s profitability significantly declined. 
The emergence of two platform leaders in China’s chip market, first MediaTek and then 
Spreadtrum, provided local manufacturers with the opportunities to produce high-tech 
mobile phone terminals, but also induced the side-effect of rapid commoditization of the 
industry. Commoditization of mobile phones into undifferentiated products significantly 
lowered the complexity of transactions between parties, and thereby transformed the 
industry’s value chains from the modular type to the market type. 
                                                   
9 In the period between the advances of US/European chip vendors and emergence of MediaTek in the 
Chinese mobile phone industry, the “Design House” group sold design blueprints to local manufacturers. 
They provided various supporting services for using chipsets of US/European venders in mobile phone 
terminals, such as software development and model design. See Shiu and Imai (2010).  
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Do emerging firms in developing countries have any chance to avoid such excessive 
competition and maintain or even upgrade their value chains? Based on detailed 
literature reviews and collections of interviews with stakeholders, Kawakami (2012) 
demonstrated how emerging companies from Taiwan succeeded in promoting their 
position in the notebook PC industry through continuous interactions with the 
prominent platform leader, Intel.  
Up until the first half of the 1990s, the notebook PC industry was dominated by 
several top Japanese companies, such as Toshiba and NEC. In the mid-1990s, Intel, who 
supplied central processing units used in these notebook PCs, launched the 
aforementioned platform strategy. Introduction of a strong platform with a highly 
standardized interface lowered technological barriers which prevented emerging 
manufacturers from entering the PC market. The movement was accelerated when Intel 
released the “Centrino” series in 2003, and, along with the anticipated emergence of 
product homogenization and price competition, the aforementioned Japanese companies 
significantly lost their positions in the notebook PC industry. 
In contrast, PC manufacturers from Taiwan chased growth opportunities during this 
period of structural change in the industry. They tactically utilized multiple supply 
networks with various branded firms from advanced economies to learn about market 
trends and product development. Alongside the relocation of production bases to 
mainland China, they successfully promoted their production capacities and upgraded 
their company profiles from mere subcontracting manufacturers to actual providers of 
various value-adding services such as product design and logistics. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
A core subject of the GVC literature is the relationship between globalization and 
economic development. As often suggested by the aforementioned “smiley curve,” less-
developed countries are increasingly worried that their economies will be “locked-in” to 
the lower value-added segment of the global production system. 
However, it is also recognized that entering GVC can offer less-developed countries 
a rich opportunity for industrial upgrading through dynamic interactions with advanced 
economies. The key to such growth is the nature of technology involved in production 
processes, which ultimately determines the speed and direction of value chain 
transformation. 
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This paper investigated the impact of new technologies on the organization of GVCs, 
with a particular attention paid to the automotive and electronic equipment industries. 
The study revealed that new features of production technology, such as modularization 
and platforms, may disrupt the present configuration of value chains and hence raise 
the possibility of new players entering the arena. The study also demonstrated that such 
a development scenario requires careful implementation of learning strategies through 
active interactions with the lead firms from advanced economies, which has important 
implications for less-developed countries who seek sustainable economic growth through 
continuous industrial upgrading. 
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